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Abstract 
This research provides a broad picture of water sector governance in Spain, a country dealing with 
serious water stress and quality problems. Moreover, a decentralized structure of regional and local 
governments supports the design and development of water policies. In this context, governance 
emerges as a key issue to improve water resources allocation. Several key policies and institutional 
features have been described, with a special attention to economic instruments and the role of private-
public partnerships (PPPs). Definitively, greater efforts in the policy-making and coordination 
processes are needed in the Spanish water sector. 
Keywords 
Water governance, economic instruments, private-public partnerships, decentralization. 
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1. Introduction 
Water has been traditionally considered as a merit good that has significant implications in economic, 
social and environmental terms (OECD, 2003, 2013). This renewable natural resource is characterized 
by a strong heterogeneity in terms of spatial distribution. Water scarcity, stress and quality problems 
are key issues that local, national and supranational institutions have to deal with. Water management 
and governance schemes become strategic when designing public policies. 
Spain is a European Union (EU) country member facing strong weather differences among regions. 
Body sources quality and availability experience broad variations depending on the area, and the 
country is subject to severe droughts (Lopez-Gunn et al. 2012) and quality problems (Willaarts et al. 
2014). Moreover, it is a federal country, where sub-central governments actively design and develop 
public policies related to water resources. However, decentralization is not always combined with 
coordination among different government levels, as explained in latter sections. As a result, economic 
and regulatory tools show a strong heterogeneity. On top of that, public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
have emerged as a usual framework to manage water resources. The expanding trend of PPPs in the 
last decades have generated a public and academic discussion about the superiority of this kind of 
organizational schemes, which will be also addressed on the next pages.   
The chapter is organized as follows. First of all, a comprehensive picture of water sector in Spain is 
presented. Next, some key issues in water governance in Spain are described, such as the River Basins 
organizational framework, the decentralization of economic instruments or citizens participation 
channels. Fourth section includes a broad discussion on the role of PPP schemes in the water sector. 
Finally, the chapter finishes with a brief summary of the main conclusions and future challenges.  
2. Water sector in Spain: outstanding problems 
Since ancient times, water services provision in Spain has been a difficult task to drive. Several 
pressures have been identified. On the one hand, Spain is the most semi-arid country in the EU 
(Lopez-Gunn et al. 2012) and droughts and other water scarcity issues frequently affect some regions 
of the country. Moreover, climate change emerges as a major threat for water management in Spain. 
An increase of the average temperatures up to +1.9°C has been predicted for 2040 (CEDEX, 2011), 
jointly with a reduction in rainfall (up to 6%). In some specific areas, such as Canary Islands and the 
Southern basins, significant changes in rainfall patterns are expected (Garrido et al., 2013). Southern 
basins could experience reductions of up to 13% of surface water runoff and around 15% of aquifers’ 
recharge, while the reductions at Eastern Mediterranean basins would be below 10%. Northern basins 
will also experience reductions, but their relative profuse resource availability will likely mitigate the 
impact (Garrido et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, significant population increases have been registered in the last decades. Thus, 
population has extended from 38.8 million in 1990 to 46.6 million in 2016 (INE, 2017a). Despite a 
negative population growth rate predicted for the next decades (INE 2017a), there are still a high 
number of people keeping the pressure up on the water supply and sewerage systems. Moreover, the 
slight GDP growth rate increase forecasted for the next years (IMF, 2017) is an additional factor with 
impact on water resources management. Water is considered as an additional input in the production 
process (Arbues et al. 2010; Renzetti, 2015). As a consequence, recovering economic activity could 
lead to intensify both industrial and agricultural water use and waste.  
Pollution and consumption are significant key-drivers of water quality. A good monitoring system 
to control the quality of water bodies emerges as an essential instrument for water governance. Under 
the enactment of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/EC), the surveillance program 
for water bodies developed in Spain has allowed the creation of a broad network of monitoring 
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stations. Willaarts et al. (2014) conclude that around 50% of surface water bodies in Spain are in poor 
ecological status. Moreover, saline intrusion and non-source pollution have been the two main sources 
lessening the quality of underground water bodies (Custodio, 2014).  
In spite of water availability and quality problems, water prices in Spain do not register a high level 
(Calatrava et al. 2015). Moreover, inefficient price schemes are still applied.
1
 The basis for water 
pricing in Spain was set at the 1985 Water Law (Garrido and Calatrava, 2009). Since then, only partial 
changes have been observed, the most important of which resulted from the transposition of the WFD 
into Spanish national legislation. However, current water prices for different users in Spain have not 
got to achieve the goals established at the WDF, especially when looking at cost recovery and 
environmental issues (Calatrava et al. 2015).  
Although water infrastructures have improved in the last decades, there is still an urgent need to 
invest in both urban wastewater treatment and water supply systems. On the one hand, average water 
leakages rate in Spain is around 25% (INE, 2014). Most worrying is that there are many cities 
where the water loss rate is much higher than the average rate, particularly in the South of Spain 
(González-Gómez et al. 2012). 
On the other hand, Spain has not got a full compliance with the Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 
21 May 1991 concerning urban wastewater treatment (Environment Agency Austria, 2015). Aldaya 
and Llamas (2012) pointed out that many wastewater treatment plants do not operate correctly, and 
most that do only perform secondary treatment (not tertiary). The cost of restoring all these treatment 
plants and upgrading those with secondary treatment has been estimated around € 19 billion. That 
figure would amount 4 € per m3, which annualized in 10 years would be about 0.45-0.5 € m3. This 
surcharge would represent an average increase of 20-40 % of the urban tariff. This is not an extremely 
large increase but it could generate high political costs (Calatrava et al., 2015). On top of that, water 
reuse, closely linked to wastewater management, is a top-listed priority area in the Strategic 
Implementation Plan of the European Innovation Partnership on Water (EIPW, 2012). However 
recycling water processes are far from being generalized. Actually, Spain shows by far the highest 
reuse potential, the calculations suggesting a value of over 1.200 Mm
3
/yr (EC, 2014).  
Definitively, water management in Spain is far to be a straightforward process. Moreover, it has not 
generated the expected outcomes. There are unfortunately still many issues that need to be resolved 
both in the short and long-run. A mixture of scarce non-controllable inputs, overpressures on water 
resources and a non-adequate design of institutional and regulatory framework are some of the reasons 
explaining the current situation of water resources in Spain. 
3. Water governance in Spain 
Water governance is the set of rules, practices, and processes (formal and informal) through which 
decisions for the management of water resources and services are taken and implemented, 
stakeholders articulate their interest and decision-makers are held accountable (OECD, 2015). 
Regulatory issues emerge as a key factor of governance in the water sector. However, formal norms 
and regulation are not the only aspects that matter in this field. Other non-necessarily formal aspects 
that articulate coordination, participation and information are also significant when attempting to 
                                                     
1
 For example, the majority of irrigation Water Users Associations face prices based on land surface. Water tariff usually 
consists of a fixed amount per-hectare. These pricing structures are intrinsically linked to overconsumption and efficiency 
losses. Additionally, some urban water tariffs include free allowances. A free allowance is a minimum water 
consumption that is charged at zero marginal price. Usually, when the user pays the fixed charge, he/she gets the right to 
consume a basic amount of water. The use of free allowances has been criticized because they lead to significant 
efficiency losses. In general, it has been proof that this kind of elements provides strong incentives to water overuse, 
being against water conservation (Castro et al., 2002), and not very equitable (OECD, 2003).  
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improve water sector outcomes management. This section is especially devoted to describe the 
regulatory framework in Spain, with special attention to federalism and economic instruments. 
3.1 An overview 
Spain is a federal country, whose bases are set at the Spanish Constitution (1978). The current vertical 
structure of government includes both central and sub-central levels. The Constitution recognizes 
explicitly the existence and right to self-governance of sub-central governments. Thus, besides the 
central government (CG), 17 Autonomous Communities (regional governments, CCAA) and 2 
Autonomous Cities at the intermediate level, and at the local level, 50 provinces and 8,124 
municipalities (MUN) in 2016 (INE, 2016).  
This framework makes water management more complex in terms of governance, since different 
levels of government develop several tasks related to water policies. As a consequence, coordination 
and negotiation processes emerge as substantial issues in this context. In the next subsection we will 
analyse the most significant topics related to water planning, economic and social aspects through the 
integrated water cycle.  
3.2 Water planning: River Basins 
River basins are the basic managerial units set at the WDF (arts. 3 and 13). These organisms are in 
charge of water planning and policy design strategies (OECD, 2011). Basin-based governance unit has 
been defended as the best scale option that can be adopted to manage water resources. In this respect, 
some advantages such as the adaptation to physical or hydro-ecological environment have been 
remarked (Cohen, 2012). However, there are some critical voices that claim higher flexibility and 
dynamism in demarcating the optimal hydrological unit (Moss, 2012). 
Spain has a long tradition using the River Basins as basic organizational and managerial units. The 
germ of the current Confederaciones Hidrográficas (CCHH) was found at the end of XIX century. In 
1865, some preliminary efforts were made in order to set a Basin-based management organization 
framework. During the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship (1923-1930) these units were endowed with legal 
and administrative contents, while in 1934 they were called using their current denomination (Del 
Moral Ituarte, 2016). During the Franco Dictatorship (1939-1975) water policy was strongly 
centralized through these organisms. However, coinciding with the return of democracy, the 
Constitution of 1978 and the State of Autonomies, sub-central governments emerged as significant 
agents in the development of water policies in the country. 
Actually, responsibilities and decisions on water policies are taken depending of the water body 
considered. On the one hand, there are inter-communitarian river basins, in charge of planning and 
managing water bodies that cross several CCAA. In this case, the responsibility of water management 
lies on the central state (Spanish Ministry of Environment). On the other hand, there are a few intra-
communitarian water bodies, where the distribution of functions between the central state and each 
region is bilaterally negotiated and set in the so-called autonomy statutes. Those could be reformed 
upon the request of the regional government. In any case, regional governments are assuming higher 
responsibilities than in the case of inter-communitarian water bodies.  
Since many years ago, there has been a long discussion about the decentralization level that is more 
convenient in this kind of situations. Thus, fiscal federalism theory recommends central public 
services provision when it comes to control for externalities and/or spill-over effects in contexts where 
cooperative management is not possible (Oates, 2001; Banzhaf and Chupp, 2012). However, several 
problems such as pollution, ecosystem degradation and water pressures are still significant in the inter-
communitarian water bodies (Thiel, 2015). Moreover, central provision imposes uniform public 
policies, neglecting sub-central heterogeneity (Banzhaf and Chupp, 2012).  
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In this context, more flexibility could be demanded, since the regional differences in Spain are 
remarkable. However, the Spanish Constitution and the European regulation strongly constrain the 
possibility of decentralization in this context. Actually, some attempts to extend the decentralization 
process on the CCHH have been aborted. That is the case of the Guadalquivir CH, in charge of an 
inter-communitarian river basin, where water bodies are shared by Andalusia, Extremadura and 
Castilla-La Mancha territories
2
.  
3.3 Economic tools and decentralization 
The WDF sets requirements for member states to take account of the principle of recovery of the costs 
of water services, including environmental and resource costs. In this respect, cost recovery should 
include both financial recovery of operational and maintenance costs (and ideally costs of capital 
renewal and extension as well) for water and sanitation services but also the recovery of the 
environmental and resource costs including costs related to water abstraction and costs induced by the 
pollution of water bodies. In this section, we will study the charges/taxes that have been designed get 
the aim of full cost recovery, and which are commonly included in final users’ water bills. We refer 
here to the water abstraction charge and the water pollution charge. 
The Spanish system combines both central and sub-central economic tools. Thus, the 1999 Spanish 
Water Act requires that water users pay different charges to River Basin authorities, since they are 
recipients of different water services. First, users of the public hydraulic domain are charged a levy to 
protect and improve the domain’s conditions. Second, urban and industrial users pay an “Effluent 
Control Levy” (Canon de Vertido) a levy on point source pollution. Third, users of surface water 
should pay a “Regulation Levy” (Canon de Regulación) to compensate the basin authority for the 
costs linked to building, operating and maintaining public water regulation infrastructures. Finally, the 
“Water Use Tariff” (Tarifa de Uso del Agua) is set to fund investment, operation and maintenance 
costs of specific infrastructures that are not regulation infrastructures (Calatrava et al., 2015).  
Moreover, regional governments are in charge of developing green taxation. The majority of them 
have set additional charges/taxes on water resources use and pollution. For instance, the “Canon de 
Saneamiento” is a usual charge set by regional governments. The main aim of this tax is to get 
revenues to finance sewage services. However, there is a broad variety of green taxes/charges related 
to the hydrological cycle. Table 1 shows the taxes/charges that Autonomous Communities have set on 
water abstraction, consumption and pollution. Except Castilla-La Mancha, all the regional 
governments have established taxes at different stages of hydrological cycle. Most of them have set 
taxes on water use and pollution, where the tax base is the real or potential (if estimated) water 
consumption. However, a broad variety of tax rate/bill schemes are observed.  
On the one hand, it is surprising that there are still free allowances in some Spanish regions, where 
a minimum consumption level is obligatorily billed. For instance, Catalonia sets a free allowance for 
domestic users of 6 m
3
 per month, mandatory included in final water bill. Other alternative schemes 
are also observed, where an exemption threshold is set, but taxpayers should pay a fixed charge (which 
could be seen as equivalent to a free allowance). This is the framework applied in some regions such 
as Andalusia, Extremadura or Galicia.
3
 On the other hand, only seven regions decide to set increasing 
                                                     
2
 In 2007 Andalusia gained exclusive responsibilities on the Guadalquivir water bodies that flowed through its territories 
and did not affect another Autonomous Community (Junta de Andalucía, 2007). A combination of different factors, such 
as the high weight of Andalusia in the basin (this region cover the most part of the Guadalquivir River Basin area), the 
fact that other communities were downstream, and some political alignments in that period led to make that decision. 
However, the remaining regions submitted claims to the Court and finally in 2011 responsibilities fell back to the central 
government (Thiel, 2015).  
3
 In Basque Country, a minimum water consumption of 130 litres per person and day is established, but no fixed charge is 
set.  
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tax rates, when the remaining regions set a linear variable tax rate. On top of that, the majority of 
regional governments apply pollution-based adjustments in the calculation of final tax bill, and some 
of them consider agglomeration factors.
4
 
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that only a few regions have levied charges on environmental 
damages linked to water abstraction. Thus, Aragón, Castilla-León and Galicia have designed a tax to 
internalize the environmental damage when abstracting water from different natural sources, storing it 
in reservoirs or dams. Water abstraction has impact on the ecological water bodies’ flow, generating 
significant environmental problems. Reservoirs storage and height are usual dimensions considered in 
the calculation of tax base.  
                                                     
4
 For instance, Catalonia considers the population size in the calculation of final tax bill, assuming that higher water 
pressure and pollution levels are generated in bigger municipalities.  
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Table 1.- Regional water taxation 
Region Tax (Spanish name) Tax event Tax base Free allowance/ 
exemption threshold 
Increasing 
tax rates 
Pollution based 
adjustments 
Andalusia Impuesto sobre vertidos a las aguas litorales emissions to coastal water 
bodies 
pollution units (1000 m3) no no yes 
  Cánon de mejora de infrestructuras hidráulicas de 
depuración 
water use and availability water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
yes  yes no 
Aragon Impuesto sobre la contaminación de las aguas water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no yes 
  Impuesto Medioambiental sobre determinados usos 
y aprovechamientos de agua embalsada 
environmental damage when 
using water from reservoirs 
reservoir storage (hm3) + 
reservoir heigh (m) 
no no no 
Asturias  Impuesto sobre las afecciones ambientales del uso 
del agua  
water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no yes no 
Balearic Islands  Cánon de saneamiento de aguas water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no yes no 
Canary Islands Cánon de vertidos water use and pollution  pollution units no no yes 
Cantabria Cánon de agua residual water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no yes 
Castilla-Leon Impuesto sobre la afección medioambiental 
causada por determinados aprovechamientos del 
agua embalsada (*)  
environmental damage when 
using water from reservoirs (*) 
reservoir storage (hm3) + 
reservoir heigh (m) 
no no no 
Castilla-La Mancha       
Catalonia Canon del agua water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
yes yes yes 
Valencia Cánon de saneamiento water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no yes 
Extremadura Cánon de saneamiento water availability  water consumption (m3) yes yes no 
Galicia Cánon de saneamiento water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
yes yes yes 
  Impuesto sobre el daño medioambiental causado 
por determinados usos y aprovechamientos del 
agua embalsada  
environmental damage when 
using water from reservoirs 
reservoir storage (hm3) no yes no 
Madrid  Tarifa de depuración de aguas residuales      
Murcia  Cánon de saneamiento water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no yes 
  Impuesto sobre vertidos a las aguas litorales emissions to coastal water 
bodies 
pollution units  no no yes 
Navarra Cánon de saneamiento de las aguas residuales de 
Navarra 
water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no no 
Basque Country Cánon del agua water use and pollution  water consumption (m3) yes no no 
La Rioja Cánon de saneamiento water use and pollution  water consumption (real o 
potential, m3) 
no no yes 
(*) This tax is also levied on other environmental damages (i.e. the visual impact of wind farms). Source: Own elaboration from http://www.minhafp.gob.es 
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Finally, we should not forget the key role of local governments in the management of water 
economic tools. Local governments are in charge of the water services provision to non-agricultural 
users. As mentioned before, Spain is an extremely atomized country, since its territory is split in more 
than 8,000 municipalities (INE, 2016). Almost 5,000 of them have less than 1,000 inhabitants (INE, 
2017a). Paradoxically, the number of municipalities has registered a slight increasing trend during the 
last decades (INE, 2017b). Retail urban water prices are set at the local level. Moreover, there is no 
central government institution or regulatory body coordinating retail water prices in Spain. As a result, 
a wide range of water structures and price levels emerges (Calatrava et al. 2015). In any case, Spanish 
water prices have been traditionally among the lowest in the European Union (OECD, 2010, 2013). 
Moreover, the country is poorly complying with the polluter-pay principle set at the European WDF 
(EEA, 2013).  
3.4 Civil society participation 
Public participation is considered to have a positive and significant impact on the quality of water 
governance (De Stephano et al. 2013). The European WFD and other EU water directives oblige Spain 
to involve civil society in the decision-taking process (Osbeck et al., 2013). Public participation should 
involve three different issues: information, consultation and active participation. Despite the 
information and consultation stages have been developed, however active participation processes are 
relatively new in Spain and “collide heavily with Spanish political and institutional tradition” (Ruiz-
Villaverde and García-Rubio, 2017, p. 2490). Civil society participation is mainly conducted through 
the Water Basin Councils (institution under the River Basin Authorities). Several stakeholders are 
involved in the design of water policies. However, different groups have different weights in the 
decision-making process, being user groups (e.g. agriculture, hydropower, urban users) have much 
stronger weight. Moreover, campaigns and demonstrations (informal participation tools) could also 
have impacted on the final policy structure. Actually, informal participation has emerged especially in 
the last decade, since “there is greater social awareness of water as a common good” (Ruiz-
Villaverde and García-Rubio, 2017, p 2491).  
4. Urban water management services: the role of PPPs 
Spanish regulatory framework
5
 establishes that local governments are responsible for guaranteeing 
urban water services. However, municipalities are flexible to choose the legal regime to provide local 
public services. The local government may choose between either managing the service in-house or 
externalizing it. When the last option is chosen, management may be transferred either to a public
6
 or 
private company. Moreover, there are some municipalities opting for joint management model, in 
order to take advantage of economies of scale.
7
 In this section, the attention is focused on the role of 
PPPs in the water sector, showing some figures and outcomes of this kind of management in Spain.  
                                                     
5
 Law 7/1985 on the Regulation of Local Government Terms and Conditions and Law 57/2003 on Local Government 
Modernization Measures and the Royal Decree 2/2000 establish the legal regimen related to the provision of municipal 
services. 
6
 Public companies are a usual scheme to provide public services in Spain. On the one hand, they provide more flexibility 
than in-house provision. On the other hand, many sub-central governments have decided to set public companies to 
provide public services as a strategy to elude the legal constraints on public deficit and debt (Fernández-Llera and García-
Valiñas, 2013). 
7
 According to González-Gómez et al. (2014) and based on FEMP (2012), 325 associations of municipalities provide 
wholesale of retail water services in Spain. Private companies are also looking for the optimal provision size, since they 
design growth strategies to provide the service to a group of municipalities close each other.  
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4.1. PPPs in Spanish water sector: schemes and figures 
Public-private partnerships are a usual way of collaboration in water services management (World 
Bank, 2006). In terms of PPP schemes, the management of the service may be either fully privatized 
(contractual PPP), or partially privatised to a mixed company, (institutionalised PPP), including both 
public and private capital (García-Valiñas et al. 2013). It is worth highlighting that Spanish legislation 
only contemplates privatising the management of the service, as the infrastructure remains in public 
hands.  
Statistics show that there has been a progressive process of water services privatization in Spain 
during the last decades. In 2008 private companies supplied 46% of the Spanish population (AEAS
8
, 
2010). During the last economic crisis, an increasing privatization trend is also observed, since local 
governments needed extra resources to reduce their level of public debt and achieve the budgetary 
stability goals (García-Valiñas et al., 2015). Thus, in 2014 private corporations provided urban water 
services to 56 % of the Spanish population (AEAS/AGA, 2016). Moreover, Spanish water industry is 
highly concentrated. Aqualia and Aguas de Barcelona are the two main private operators
9
 (García-
Valiñas et al. 2013; González-Gómez et al. 2014; Bel et al. 2015). 
Contractual public-private partnerships are one of the most widespread forms of public services 
privatisation in Spain. In 2014, fully private companies provided water services to the 34% of Spanish 
population (AEAS/AGA, 2016). Concessions are the usual way through which the local government 
entrusts an individual or legal entity with the management. They are awarded following a public 
tender and for a limited period of time. In the case of water supply companies, contracts that involve 
building infrastructures and operating the service must be no longer than fifty years, while those that 
only imply running the service have a twenty-five-year constrain
10
. At the end of the contract, local 
governments must again decide how they wish the service to be managed for the next years. 
Institutionalized PPPs are another alternative scheme to allow private sector sharing in urban water 
services management (Gonzalez-Gomez et al., 2011; García-Valiñas et al. 2013), whereby board is 
shared between the private and public sector. In those companies, local government participation is 
usually sufficiently significant to guarantee that public objectives will be accomplished successfully. 
In 2014, those entities served to the 22% of Spanish population (AEAS/AGA, 2016). This form of 
management has significantly gained weight in the last years (AEAS/AGA, 2016), since it makes 
possible to merge public interests (universal access, quality standards) with the industry know-how of 
private firms. In this sense, the private partner is mainly responsible for the daily water services 
management, while the public partner makes political decisions.  
Whatever the PPP scheme is, when local governments allow private initiative coming into the 
management of water services, there is a bidding announcement with some requirements to operators 
in order to attend to the competition. Those specifications include, among others, a minimum entrance 
and/or annual fees, and/or a certain level of investment during the concession period. Private operators 
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 The Spanish Association of Water Supply and Sanitation (AEAS) is a private organization carrying out periodic surveys 
on water services and pricing in Spain. Nowadays, it is the only source from which it is possible to get statistical 
information on PPPs in Spain, since no official institution is collecting such information. However, these surveys are not 
census, since they represent approximately 40% of the population and 88% of municipalities (González-Gómez et al. 
2014).  
9
 Acciona, Valoriza, Gestagua, Aguas de Valencia, FACSA, Agua & Gestión, PRODAISA, Espina & Delfín and 
Hidrogestión are examples of minor companies (at the national level) operating in the Spanish water sector (Gónzalez-
Gómez et al. 2014).  
10
 Contracts’ lenght is nowadays under discussion. Spanish parliament is currently debating a draft law to implement the 
transposition of some European Directives related to public contracts (2014/23/UE; 2014/24/UE; 2014/25/UE) into 
national law. According to the European regulation, contracts could not be longer than five years, and only extensions 
would be accepted if are justified by new investments. Further information on the draft bill could be checked at 
http://transparencia.gob.es.  
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might submit a bid trying to improve those minimum requirements. Once registered all the bids, local 
governments will make a decision based on several criteria (García-Valiñas et al., 2015).  
4.2 PPPs in Spanish water sector: outcomes 
There is not a wide body of scientific literature comparing public and private management in the 
Spanish water sector. One of the main reasons is the difficulty to collect data on the industry, since no 
official institution provides micro-data and/or disaggregated information. That fact makes complex the 
economic analysis of water sector in the country. The majority of published papers consider partial 
and small-size samples, since capturing information is a difficult task. In any case, there are three key 
dimensions where empirical studies have focused on: efficiency, prices and quality. Tables 2 to 4 
summarize the main contributions in the three aforementioned items.  
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Table 2.- PPPs and water services efficiency in Spain 
Reference Sample Area and period Main variables Methodology Key results 
García-Sánchez 
(2006) 
24 municipalities 
(over 50,000 
inhabitants: 21,24% 
national population ) 
National scope, 
1999 
Inputs: staff;  
treatment plants; delivery network;  
total costs  
 
Outputs: water supplied; number of connections; quality 
analyses 
DEA; non-controllable 
inputs; second stage 
(tobit model) 
No significant differences 
between public and private 
management were found 
Picazo-Tadeo et al. 
(2009 a) 
34 municipalities 
(50% regional 
population) 
Andalusia, 2001 
Inputs: delivery network; sewer network; labour; 
operational costs 
 
Outputs: water delivered; collected sewage; treated 
sewage 
SFA; second stage to 
capture the effect of 
environmental variables 
Private utilities outperform public 
companies in the management of 
labour 
Picazo-Tadeo et al. 
(2009 b) 
34 municipalities 
(50% regional 
population) 
Andalusia, 2001 
Inputs: delivery network; sewer network; labour; 
ground, surface and purchased water 
 
Outputs: water delivered; collected sewage; treated 
sewage 
DEA; second stage to 
capture the effect of 
environmental variables 
Private utilities are superior to 
public companies in the 
management of labour 
García-Rubio et al. 
(2010) 
20 water utilities  
Andalusia, 1993-
2006 
Inputs: labour costs; operational costs; hydraulic yield 
 
Outputs: water delivery; connections; delivery network; 
quality 
  
DEA 
Differences between public and 
private governance disappear 
when hydraulic yield (proxy of 
the degree of renovation network) 
is included in the analysis 
González-Gómez et 
al. (2013) 
80 rural water utilities  Andalusia, 2009 
Inputs: delivery 
network; wastewater treatment capacity; staff costs; 
operational costs 
  
Outputs: population; sewage treated  
DEA, controlling for 
environmental factors 
No significant differences 
between public and private 
management were found when 
controlling for environmental 
factors 
Suárez-Varela et al. 
(2017) 
70 municipalities 
(under 50,000 
inhabitants) 
National scope, 
2013 
Inputs: labour; operational costs; distribution network 
 
Outputs: water delivered; population served  
DEA; metafrontiers and 
directional distance 
functions  
Private utilities are superior to 
public companies in the 
management of labour 
Legend: DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis; SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Source: own elaboration 
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Efficiency has been a substantially controversial issue. From a theoretical point of view, it has been 
traditionally argued that private companies could be more efficient, since they are specialized in the 
provision of water services, while local public entities have to deal with different kind of services. 
However, the empirical evidence in Spain does not show clear conclusions on this particular issue. 
Among others, García-Sánchez (2006), González-Gómez and García-Rubio (2008) and González-
Gómez et al. (2013) show that there is no evidence of the superiority of private management with 
respect to public one. Spain is a highly heterogeneous country, where climatic and regional differences 
emerge. Some papers have shown that, once controlled for non-controlled inputs and environmental 
factors, efficiency differences between private and public management tend to disappear (García-
Rubio et al. 2010; González-Gómez et al. 2013).  
Another interesting conclusion is that private corporations seem to be more efficient in managing 
specific inputs. Using non-parametric techniques, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2009a,b) and Suárez-Varela et 
al. (2017) found that private firms are more efficient when dealing with labour. These findings are 
basically explained by the higher flexibility of the regulatory and legal context for private firms. As 
Suárez-Varela et al. (2017, p. 2366) mentioned, “the superiority of the technology used by private 
units in the management of labour might be due to certain regulatory and institutional restrictions 
faced by public management units that could reduce their flexibility in adjusting this production 
factor. In general, public managers are constrained by more stringent labour regulation which makes 
it more difficult to fire employees, and they also face higher levels of absenteeism (…). In addition, 
local governments, particularly those ruled by left-wing parties, tend to develop policies to promote 
employment stability (…). Finally, creating overemployment when public services are delivered in-
house might also form part of local politicians’ rent- seeking strategy (…)”.  
Regarding water prices, previous literature has not found clear conclusions for the Spanish case. 
All the studies have focused on residential water tariffs, since it is a controversial sector where 
different policy aims merge (OECD, 2003). On the one hand, some previous studies have detected 
higher price levels under private provision (Martínez-Espiñeira et al. 2009). Similarly, Bel et al., 
(2015) found that private firms with a larger market share set higher water prices. On the other hand, 
some studies conclude that public management do not necessarily lead to lower prices. Based on a 
sample of Southern Spanish municipalities, García-Valiñas et al. (2013) found that public companies 
supplying water services set higher prices than those established under any PPP scheme. However, 
when looking at the price paid for low water consumption levels, conclusions could change. In this 
respect, García-Valiñas et al. (2010) showed that in-house provision leads to set more affordable water 
prices in Andalucia. They argued that the proportion of income spent in a minimum water threshold is 
lower when the service is not outsourced.  
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Table 3.- PPPs and residential water prices in Spain 
Reference Sample Area and period Main variables Methodology Key results 
Martínez-
Espiñeira et al. 
2009 
53 municipalities (over 
100.000 inhabitants; 
33.5% of national 
population) 
National scope, 2006 
Dependent variable: monthly water bill for several 
consumption levels (3,5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 50 m
3
)  
 
Independent variables: weather conditions; water tariff 
characteristics; water quality and treatment; geographical, 
housing and sociodemographic factors; political 
orientation of local government; private/public 
management dummies 
OLS, RE, FILM 
Private management of water 
services leads to set higher 
prices 
García-Valiñas et 
al. (2010) 
301 municipalities (79% 
of regional population) 
Andalusia, 2005 
Dependent: household expense on basic water threshold 
(% of municipal average income). 
 
Independent variables: Income; geographical, housing and 
sociodemographic factors; water tariff characteristics; 
provincial and river basin dummies; private/public 
management dummies 
OLS 
More affordable residential 
water tariffs under in-house 
provision regime 
García-Valiñas et 
al. (2013) 
396 municipalities (60% 
of regional population) 
Andalusia, 2009 
Dependent variable: average representative bill (15 
m3/month)  
 
Independent variables: population; housing stock; water 
treatment; different management regimes; market 
concentration index; water corporation dummies 
OLS, FILM 
Public companies supplying 
water services set higher 
prices that those establish 
under any PPP scheme. 
Bel et al. (2015) 
715 municipalities (93% 
of municipalities in the 
region) 
Andalusia, 2009 
Dependent variable: average representative bill (15 
m3/month)  
 
Independent variables: population; population density; 
water treatment; different management regimes; water 
corporation dummies market concentration indices  
  
  
FILM 
Private firms  
with a larger market share 
make their dominant position 
effective by setting higher 
water prices  
  
  
OLS: Ordinary least Squares; RE: Random effects model; FILM: Heckman selection models based on full information maximum likelihood  
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 4.- PPPs and water services quality in Spain 
Reference Sample Area and 
period 
Main variables Methodology Key results 
Gonzalez-
Gómez et al. 
(2012) 
133 municipalities 
(50% of regional 
population) 
Andalusia, 
2005 
Dependent variable: percentage of water 
losses 
 
Independent variables: population; 
population growth; water treatment; 
abstraction and network characteristics; local 
financial burden; local government ideology; 
water price levels; different management 
regimes 
WLS Water services outsourcing is linked to higher 
water losses. Private suppliers seem to lack 
incentives to 
devote resources to the reduction of water 
losses  
 
García-Rubio 
et al. (2016) 
1023 individuals, 
covering information 
is on 64 Spanish 
cities (population 
over 100,000 
inhabitants) 
National scope, 
2011 
Dependent variable: respondent’s satisfaction 
with tap water quality on a scale 1 to 4 
 
Independent variables: gender, age, education, 
income; ideology; water price; public services 
satisfaction; water chemical characteristics; 
geographical and climatic characteristics; 
private/public management dummies  
 
OLM User’s tap water quality perceptions are 
worse when a private company is managing 
water services 
WLS: weighted least squares; OLM: Ordered logit model 
Source: own elaboration 
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Finally, only a few studies have focused on the quality dimension of water services. A priori, it is 
expected that private firms looking for profits could reduce water services quality standards, in order 
to keep/increase their mark-up. One significant dimension of water services quality are due to the 
network losses. Some authors have mentioned that private companies have no incentive to repair water 
losses, since raw water abstraction costs are lower (Garcia and Thomas, 2003). Gonzalez-Gómez et al. 
(2012) found more significant water leakages levels under any PPP scheme. Moreover, tap water 
quality is another significant dimension. García-Rubio et al. (2016) analysed users’ perceptions on tap 
water quality, finding that users’ perceptions are poorer when there is a private company supplying 
water.  
5. Conclusions 
Throughout these pages, a broad picture of water sector governance in Spain has been provided. 
Extremely heterogeneous country, Spain is dealing with serious water stress and quality problems. In 
this context, the design of a good institutional and regulatory framework could contribute to get an 
equitable and efficient use of water bodies. Then, governance emerges as a key issue to improve water 
resources allocation.  
We have also explained how this country is characterized by a federal structure of regional and 
local governments that participate in the design and development of water policies. As a consequence, 
water sector management is felt in general to be complex, in terms of the agents and organizations 
involved. The strong variety of economic and regulatory tools make difficult the coordination and 
cooperation among different institutions. Moreover, the exceptionally atomized map of sub-central 
governments planning water policies are not always aligned with European Union requirements. On 
top of that, the weight of PPPs schemes in the management of water resources in Spain has increased 
in the last decades. However, checking the empirical literature on efficiency, prices and quality, no 
intensively positive outcomes have been detected in the last years.  
Some authors have claimed the urgent need to coordinate water policies in Spain, through the 
establishment of a regulatory agency with jurisdiction throughout the national territory (González-
Gómez et al., 2014). However, this option is a very sensitive topic in a highly decentralized nation, 
where sub-central governments are trying to conquer new policy areas to develop their autonomy, 
instead of looking for joint or central actions.  
Moreover, as De Stefano et al. (2013, p.224) pointed out, “the most compelling challenge is 
possibly ensuring the reliability and the consistency of the information made available by public 
administrations”. Despite the efforts made in the last years, more public institutional support and 
transparency is needed when it comes to collect and publish information related to the Spanish water 
sector. 
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